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A MERICANS GO on thousands of business trips and vaca-

tions every year. Many potential travelers go through a
travel agent to book their trips. The travel agents, in turn, use
sophisticated systems to determine the best price and times for
their customers to travel and the best available hotels in their
destination cities. These systems are called computer reservations systems (CRS). Computer reservations systems are the
backbone of the travel agent's business. These systems allow the
agent to reserve airline tickets, hotel rooms, and rental cars.
Computer reservations systems first appeared in the late
1970s; since then, they have become increasingly important, almost indispensable, for both travel agents and airlines. Airline
companies first developed CRS and still control a majority of the
current CRS. The close connection between travel booking
(CRS) and travel operation (airlines) led to a climate where legal challenges seemed inevitable. Smaller airlines filed antitrust

suits against the airlines that owned CRS.' The plaintiffs in
these suits claimed that the airlines that controlled the CRS unfairly prejudiced the displays, which in turn affected reservation
volume in favor of the CRS owner's airline.'

I When the Civil Aeronautics Board reviewed CRS practices, they found actions that may be "analogous to conduct that would be labeled an abuse of mo-

nopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2." Carrier-Owned
Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644, 11,647 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
2 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.
1991).
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After airline deregulation in 1978,- the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) found it necessary to regulate the CRS industry.4
The CAB promulgated many administrative regulations.' The
regulations dealt with all facets of the CRS industry." The CAB
regulations sought to avoid the problems identified in various
antitrust cases. 7 These regulations, with few modifications, exist
today. This comment will examine many topics; one important
question it seeks to answer is: "Are the regulations still
necessary?"
In the late 1990s, the CRS industry made these systems available to non-travel agent users, via the Internet. The programs
allow users to choose a time, date, and destination for travel.
The CRS then searches its database to find an acceptable itinerary based on the user's preferences (price, airline, etc.). Internet users may purchase their tickets on-line through secure
connections in the system.' This form of travel reservation may
soon surpass agent reservation.' Because Internet use of CRS by
non-travel agents is new, many are questioning what impact the
3 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.).
, It was assumed that when Congress deregulated the airline industry, the absence of economies of scale would increase the number of competitors. In reality
though, the existence of CRS reduced airline competition through marketing
and pricing structures. CRS owning airlines would bias their flights over other
airlines participating in the CRS. This would give the owner of the CRS a competitive advantage in the airline market. In addition, CRS were a barrier to the
entry of new and smaller airlines. They could not afford to participate in a CRS,
a vital component in competition since most travel agents book through a CRS.
These factors, along with others, led to a supposed need for regulation. See Mad
J. Learning, Enlightened Regulation of Computerized Reservations Systems Requires a
Conscious Balance Between Consumer Protection and Profitable Airline Marketing, 21
TRANSP. L.J. 469, 476 (1993).
5 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. §§ 255.1-255.12
(1998).
6 The regulations will be discussed more fully in later sections, but include
display bias, discrimination among carriers, participation by owner airlines, term
of contracts, marketing, and booking information.
7 See generally, Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 536 (explaining that problems include biasing, small carrier biasing, and violations of antitrust statutes).
8 A secure connection is a connection via the Internet in which it would be
virtually impossible to "hack" into the system and steal the user's credit card number. In essence, it is a connection that allows safe passing of personal
information.
9 The DOT recognized the growing field of Internet CRS systems. They stated,
though, that there are currently "relatively few bookings through these services."
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606, 47,607
(1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255). The DOT also recognized that industry experts believe that the Internet will eventually reduce the importance of
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current regulations have or will have on these sites. This comment will examine whether or not the current regulations apply
to the Internet CRS or, if in the current business climate, the
regulations are still necessary. Because the DOT has called for
comments on revisions of the current regulations, this topic is
timely."' The revision is still not complete. In the interim, the
question remains, do the Internet CRS have to conform to the
DOT regulations?
This comment will examine the implications of continued
regulation of CRS. Part I looks at the development, participation in, and operation of CRS. Part II examines the concerns
surrounding CRS. Part III focuses on the legal developments
concerning CRS. Because most CRS are owned by airlines that
try to get an advantage, there have been many challenges to CRS
development and marketing. Part TV focuses on the current Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated regulations
and their continued necessity. Finally, Part V examines how the
DOT regulations will apply (or will not apply) to CRS use on the
Internet.
1. BACKGROUND
A.

1.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS

Original Computer Reservations Systems

Before the development of CRS, airline carriers or travel
agents working with the carriers sold airline tickets. The travel
agent would question the traveler as to his travel needs. The
agent would then turn to the Official Airline Guide (OAG), a
book containing carrier schedules and fare information."' Using this information, the travel agent would determine the
2
flights and carriers that could best fit the customer's needs.'
The agent would next turn to the carrier tariffs, volumes conCRS. See id. at 47,608. An important note, though, is that Internet travel information is facilitated through existing CRS.

", See generally Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
47,606 (1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255). The DOT keeps extending

the sunset date of the CRS regulations. Currently, the regulations remain in
force until March 31, 2001.

See Third Extension of Computer Reservation Sys-

tems (CRS) Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,808, 16,809 (2000) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 255).
11 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,648 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
12 See id.
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taining the fare, rules, and restrictions for each flight.'
The
agent would then call the air carrier to confirm the price and
availability and to make a reservation for the traveler.' 4 Finally,
the agent would write the airline ticket by hand to complete the

process. 15
In the 1960s, the first attempt at a CRS was under the name of
Automatic Travel Agency Reservations System (ATARS). ' This
was to be a joint venture among travel agents and twenty-one
different airlines.' 7 This failed, in part, due to an early investigation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)." s The CAB investigated the proposal to examine the possible impact of an
industry-wide, single system on the air transportation industry."'
The CAB refused to grant antitrust immunity to the proposed
system.2 1 Accordingly, the project was abandoned.
Soon after, in 1976, both American Airlines and United Airlines announced that they would separately develop their own
CRS. 2 ' TWA soon followed in announcing that too would develop its own system. 2 2 The "traditional" process of finding and
reserving seats on airlines was cumbersome. 3 In response, airlines began developing their own in-house computer reservation
systems.2 4 It was only a matter of time before these in-house systems were expanded to be an industry-wide system.25
Airline deregulation also began to emphasize the necessity of
these systems.26 The systems became necessary after deregulation because the number of fare and service offerings grew.2 7 In
'3

See id.
See id.

'5

See id.

See Learning, supra note 4, at 471.
17 See id. at 472.

18 See id. The CAB was the government agency charged with regulating the
airlines. See infra Part 111.B.1.
I9 See id.
20 See id.

See DonaldJ. Boudreaux & Jerome Ellig, Beneficent Bias: The Case Against RegulatingAirline Computerized Reservation Systems, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 567, 571 (1992).
22 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644
11,649 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
23 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "traditional" process.
24 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
21

25i

See id.

2, See id.
27

See id.
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addition, fare and schedule changes became more frequent. "8
Those in the industry needed a computer-based system able to
deal with vast amounts of information. New carriers also entered the market after deregulation. 29 This too required a sophisticated system able to deal with the ever-increasing number
of flights.
Computer reservations systems and their development quickly
became an industry.") The CAB recognized in 1984, "that CRS's
[sic] have become the primary information and distribution resource for airlines and travel agents.""' CRS vendors have since
captured a niche in the travel industry. Most travel
agencies use
2
1
CRS.
through
are
sales
airline
most
and
CRS
There have been many different CRS in the past; most of
which have been owned by airline companies. For example, in
1983 there were six different CRS: Apollo, owned by United;
DATAS II, owned by Delta; MARS PLUS, developed by ITT in
conjunction with various airlines; PARS, operated by TWA; Sabre, owned by American; and SODA, operated by Eastern:"
Due to consolidations and closures there are currently only
four domestic CRS. These include Sabre, Apollo, Worldspan,
and System One/Amadeus. 4 Sabre recently spun-off from
American Airlines,3 5 Apollo is operated by Galileo International
which is owned by United Airlines, Worldspan was formed
through a merger of Trans World Airline's and Delta's systems
and was joined by Northwest Airlines, and System One, was developed by Eastern Airlines and acquired by Continental Airlines."" Galileo (Apollo) has public shareholders, it is not wholly
28 See id. For example, airline carriers change about 133,000 fares and more
than 3,000 flight schedules in a typical day. See Learning, supra note 4, at 475.
29 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
'10See Learning, supra note 4, at 472. ("When the major airline carriers devel-

oped their CRSs, a new industry emerged.")
3,1 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
3'21See Leaming, supra note 4, at 472. ("By 1987, 95 percent of all domestic
travel agencies used CRSs and travel agents booked 92 percent of the domestic
airline sales through them.")
'3 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649.
'14 See Kevin j. Johnson, Computer Reservations System Participation:Is It Still Necessary for Smaller Caniers?, 11 SPG AIR & SPACE LAw 1, 1 (1997).
3 See SABRE, AMR Completes Sabre Spin-Off News Release, Mar. 16, 2000 (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://ir.stockmaster.com/wc/form/Pl?template=ir/TSG/
viewarticle2&Symbol=TSG&fi rst=&ArticlelD=SM-TSG-20000316a>.
36 See Robert F. Barron II, Code-ShareAgreements: A Developing Trend in U.S. Bilateral Aviation Negotiations, 72 IND. L.J. 529, 536 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline
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owned by the airline. 7 Sabre and Apollo are the two largest
systems. In 1999, the Sabre Group had revenues of $2.4 billion. 8 Galileo's (Apollo) revenue in the same year was $1.5
billion. 9
In conclusion, many factors led to the development of CRS.
Airline deregulation was probably the most important of these.
In addition, travel industry growth also propelled development.
Because of their ability to manage a vast amount of travel information, the CRS have become more important and possibly indispensable to the travel industry.
2.

Internet Computer Reservations Systems

Many Internet sites allow users to access CRS. Sabre offers
www.travelocity.com; Galileo originally developed www.
travelpoint.com, which is no longer available, but they have now
acquired www.trip.com; Worldspan controls www.worldspan.
net 4°; and Amadeus offers www.amadeus.net. These are the
same systems offered to travel agents.
Internet CRS are relatively new. If rated by market share, Sabre and Galileo are the two most popular CRS.41 Sabre
launched

its Travelocity site in March of 1996.42

Galileo

launched its system through Travelpoint November 4, 1997. 4Since then, the use of the Internet to book flights has greatly
increased. For example, Travelocity recently broke records with
its first million dollar day and six million dollar week.4 4
Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837, 63,839
(1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
'7 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. at 63,839.
38 See SABRE, CorporateFacts (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.sabre.com/
about/corp~jacts.html>.
39 See Galileo, 1999Financials(visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.galileo.com/
investor/fin/invfin99.htm>.
40 Worldspan is provided through Tampa Travel Service, Inc. See Worldspan,
Dates & Destinations (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.worldspan.net>.
41 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,784,
59,785 (1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
42 See SABRE, Travelocity Breaks On-Line Sales Records with First $1 Million Day and
First $6 Million Week (last modified July 29, 1998) <http://www.sabre.com/news/
new98729a.htm>.
43 See Galileo, Galileo International Announces Global Launch of Travelpoint.com,
News Release, Nov. 4, 1997 (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.galileo.com/investor/finl>.
'14 See SABRE, Travelocity Breaks On-Line Sales Records with First $1 Million Day and
First $6 Million Week, (last modified July 29, 1998) <http://www.sabre.com/news/
new98729a.htm>.
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Travelocity provides reservation capabilities for more than "420
airlines, more than 40,000 hotels and more than 50 car rental
45
companies.

On the Amadeus web site, users must actually purchase the
ticket through a travel agent. The site states "[i]f you are new to
Amadeus, you will have to find a travel agent to handle your
bookings." ' Using this system, people may only check on flight
availability and price. Internet users on the Travelocity,
Trip.com, and Worldspan sites may actually book and purchase
tickets to be mailed or picked up at the airport. These systems
allow Internet users to bypass travel agents entirely.
In addition to allowing non-travel agents to use CRS on-line,
many companies have developed sites for use by travel agents.
For example, EasySABRE is used by travel agents on-line.47 In
addition, there are other various sites such as www.airtickets.
corn, which allow registered travel agents to use airfare consolidators through multiple CRS.48
B.

PARTICIPATION IN COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS

"[V]irtually all U.S. airlines have found it essential to distribute their services through each of the four CRSs operating in
the United States due to two factors: the importance of travel
agencies in the distribution of airline services and each travel
agency's predominant use of a single system."4" These two factors are an important part of the decision of air carriers, especially smaller carriers, to participate in CRS.
In 1987, ninety-five percent of travel agents subscribed to a
CRS. ' In addition, ninety-two percent of ticket sales were
booked through a travel agency.5" Air carriers cannot ignore
these statistics. Most travel agencies subscribe to only one
, See id.
46 Amadeus, Amadeus.net (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.amadeus.net/
home/en/bookings/index_ta.htm>.
7 See <http://v.easysabre.com>.
48

Airfare consolidators are businesses, like the aforementioned site and Coun-

cilTravel, which buy large blocks of airline tickets at reduced prices. These reduceCd prices allow the businesses to sell airline tickets to customers at greatly
reduced fares.
' Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,197,
42,198 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
50 See
51

Johnson, supra note 34, at *9.

See on

3
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CRS.5 2 Therefore, the airline companies, even smaller carriers,
usually must participate in all of the available CRS in order to
compete with other airlines. This reliance on CRS has allowed
the CRS industry to dictate its own terms for participation in the
system.5 ' This is a problem because the terms of the CRS owner
may not be favorable for competing airlines or for travel agents.
Because of the structure of the CRS industry, however, the competing airlines and travel agencies really have no other choice
but to participate on the CRS vendors' terms if they plan to compete in the travel industry. This has caused the anticompetitive
problems discussed in Part II.
C.

1.

OPERATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS

Travel Agent Operation

"A CRS consists of a periodically-updated central database
that contains information on airline services and other travel
services sold through the system. 5' 4 The flow of information is
almost instantaneous. Airlines load their fares electronically
through the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO). 5
ATPCO is a distribution system owned by twenty-four different
international and domestic airlines. 56 This company currently
collects information from over 550 airlines and distributes it to
CRS (e.g., Amadeus/System One, Galileo International, and Sabre) .5 This database creates efficiencies in the process by per-52See id. In addition, many CRS make it very difficult for travel agencies to
subscribe to more than one CRS. The CRS restrict travel agents by requiring that
a certain percentage of bookings must be by their system. This percentage is always greater than fifty percent. See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651.
53 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at
59,784. (The terms for participation can include equipment clauses, participation levels for travel agents, and parity clauses for competing airlines.)
54 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,313,
59,314 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
5-,
See Leaming, supra note 4, at 474.
56 These include: Air Canada, Air France, Alaska Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines,
Inc., American Airlines, Inc., British Airways, Canadian Airlines International,
Ltd., Chicago Helicopter Airways, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Delta Air Lines,
Inc., Federal Express Corporation, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Iberia Air Lines of
Spain, Japan Airlines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, LA Helicopter, Inc., LtIfthansa
German Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Inc., Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., Scandinavian Airlines System, Swissair, Trans World Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines,
Inc., US Airways, Inc. See ATPCO, Our Owners (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.
atpco.net/setabout.html>.
57 See ATPCO, About ATPCO (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.atpco.net/
setabout.html>.
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mitting each airline to submit its information via ATPCO,
thereby giving each CRS the opportunity to access a single
source of fare-related data." The CRS and airlines subscribe to
the ATPCO. To the CRS, ATPCO offers automated data subscriptions of passenger fares, rules, routings, cargo rates, and car
rental rates." The CRS then provides the ATPCO information
to their subscribers, the travel agents.
The CRS system itself is made up of computer terminals,
printers, and telecommunications links located in the travel
agent's office, usually leased from the CRS company."' This
computer is connected, via modem, to the CRS master computer. It allows travel agents to determine "schedule, fare, and
seat availability information for every airline that subscribes to
the CRS.""' In addition, the travel agent can reserve a seat for
the customer and print out tickets. 6 2 The reservations are made
through the CRS by routing the information provided by the
travel agent to the central database of the CRS vendor, which
3
then relays the information to the air carrier.1
2.

Internet Operation

Anyone (travel agents or not) may log on to a CRS on-line.
All four CRS have web sites."4 Most of the sites require that the
user have a user name and a password to enter." This is easily
obtained on first entry to the site. Users simply enter name, email, password choice, address, and travel preferences. The system creates a user profile and then the user can automatically
access the site. After entering a name and password, the system
allows the user to chose from many options including airline,
hotel, and/or car reservations.
58

See id.

5) See id.

60See Learning, supra note 4, at 474.
61 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.
1991).
62 See United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th
Cir. 1985).
63 See Learning, supra note 4, at 475.
64 See supra notes 38-40, 46 and accompanying text for Internet addresses of
the CRS.
65The passwords seem to be a marketing tool for the company providing the
site. For example, Travelocity states: "We ...use information you provide during
member registration or as part of the reservation process to customize the content of our site to meet your specific needs and to make product improvements
to Travelocity." Travelocity, Privacy Policy (visited Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www2.
travelocity.com/about/privacy.h tml>.
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To obtain airline tickets, users enter the time, date, and cities
of both departure and return. They may also enter one or more
of several preferences: airline carrier, price, etc. After all the
required information has been entered, the system checks its
database and returns several different travel options.
II.

CONCERNS REGARDING COMPUTER
RESERVATION SYSTEMS
A.

BIASING

Biasing is a serious concern in the CRS industry, it is defined
as "displaying flight information in a way that favors their [CRS
owners] own flights."6 6 Biasing became a noticeable problem in
the early 1980s. The Department of Transportation found that
display bias was "rampant" before regulation began.67
Biasing is a problem of "deception."6 Many people did not
realize that when they talked to a travel agent and asked him to
book them on the most convenient flight the agent would be
using a "reservation system tilted in favor of the carrier that sold
him the system."69 In reality, however, CRS carriers biased the
displays in favor of their own services."' This inhibits a travel
agent's ability to provide objective advice. 7"
The ability of the CRS to control biasing is created by the industry itself. Because airlines must participate in all systems due
to the role of travel agencies in airline distribution and the
agencies' reliance on CRS, each CRS is able to dictate its terms
for airline participation.7 2 The CRS control of the terms of participation gives travel agents and airlines little leverage to question bias.
There is great potential for airlines to bias their displays. Airlines would use their system to "prejudice airline competition
and give consumers misleading or incomplete information in
order to obtain more bookings."73 In addition, the Department
of Justice found that "airlines which own computerized reserva66 United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1107.

67 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 573.
68 See United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1113.
69 Id.
70 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,647 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).

71 See id.
72 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at
59,784.
73Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 47,607.
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tion systems use them to weaken competition from other
airlines."7 4
CRS vendors were often biasing the algorithms7 5 used to determine priority on the screen by weighting specific criteria designed to produce the result that their flights were a "better
fit."'76 In this way, for example, CRS vendor X (airline owner X)
can instruct the computer CRS program to find X a better
choice for the customer (using price, route, or on-time variables). There are dangers in the process even if airline X's
flight is not the first displayed. For example,
A CRS can display a limited number of flights on its screen at a
time; if more flights are available in a market than can be displayed on a single screen, an agent using the CRS must ask to see
additional screens to see more flights. Travel agents often work
under significant time pressure, and as a result agents are more
likely to book a flight that shows up on the first screen than
flights appearing on later screens, even if the latter would better
77
meet a customer's needs.
Possibly because the agents believed that the systems were unbiased, they were more likely to book a flight when it appeared
on the first screen of the display, and the flight most often
7
booked was the first flight shown on the first screen. 1
Another type of biasing can occur if fare information is omitted or delayed.79 Apparently, new schedules or fares were often
not included in CRS.a° In addition, some full flights would show
up as available and flights with unsold seats would show up as
full.y Misinformation such as this is just as harmful as the disUnited Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1110-11.
Algorithms are the formulas used by a CRS vendor to determine which
flights fit the customer's request best and ultimately determine the order of those
flights that will appear on the screen in response to a travel request.
76 See Leaming, supra note 4, at 485. (CRS vendors establish weights for certain
criteria such as departure and arrival times, plane types, city pairs, connecting
time, etc. By weighting one or more of these criteria, a CRS vendor can almost
ensure that their flights are first. The DOT found that United increased its revenues by thirteen percent using this method.)
77 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,78586.
78 See Fair Displays of Airline Services
in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRS), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
79 See Leaming, supra note 4, at 485.
81 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,662 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255) (sales and special fares may be
delayed, resulting in lower bookings).
74
75

81

See id.
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play biasing previously discussed. CRS owners' control of the
flow of information can also harm competition. Special deals
from smaller carriers may not timely appear on the CRS display,
causing that carrier to book fewer flights and hence, earn less
money.
The airlines could also bias using certain criteria to rank
flights. For example, they could "select a limited number of
connecting points for each city-pair market and construct connections over those points and edit out certain connections,
based on various criteria. 8' 2 This type of biasing, too, could
harm competition. The CRS vendor could designate the criteria
in a way to choose its own airline carrier on a consistent basis.
For example, CRS vendor X (airline owner X) is headquartered
in Dallas, Texas. The CRS vendor could construct a program
that no matter the customer's other preferences, if he were to
fly into Dallas, airline X would always be displayed first. Because
it could not be detected easily, the potential for abuse, and
83
therefore impact on competition, is great.
Other types of display biasing include: omitting types of services available from an airline at a given hub, limiting the
amount of information available on competing airlines, creating
an advantageous algorithm that consistently chooses the CRS
vendor airline over others, and providing inaccurate or skewed
information on connecting services.8 4
It seems that a slight bias in display would not make a difference. The Department of Transportation found that "it [the
problem of biasing] is big enough to generate millions of dollars in extra passenger revenues for such airlines."8 The CAB
originally adopted CRS rules to prevent and correct the abovementioned forms of bias. 8"
B.

COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES FOR TRAVEL AGENTS

Travel agencies must use CRS in order to provide services to
their customers. Agents usually subscribe to only one CRS. 7
There are agents, though, that subscribe to more than one CRS.
82 h. at 11,657.
83 See id.
84 See Learning, supra note 4, at 485-86.
85 United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir.
1985).
86 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg, at 63,839.
87 See Johnson, supra note 34, at *9.
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In order to increase bookings, CRS give incentives to travel
agents who use their system to book flights.
There are four types of incentives that CRS give to travel
agents.88
First, agents enjoy "override commissions" based on the volume of business booked with the airline offering the bonus.
Second, agents may be given membership in the airline's VIP
club, providing special waiting area and additional services for
members. Third, while flights may appear on the CRS screen as
completely booked, agents have overbooking privileges on the
carrier that owns the CRS that they are using. This privilege is
particularly useful to agents who must reserve last-minute
trips-generally for their business customers. Finally, airlines
provide free tickets through an award system similar to frequent
flyer plans for their passengers. Airlines will also offer sales incentives through free or reduced fare tickets to employees of
travel agents." '
In addition to these, travel agents may receive funding from
CRS vendors to advertiseY. These types of incentives not only
influence the system used by travel agents but also the level of
travel agent participation. These incentives also affect the
choices available to consumers. This potential limitation on
consumer choices is important for the same reason discussed in
the previous section: deception. Many people see travel agents
as their agents, not the agents of the CRS vendors. The influence of the CRS inhibits a travel agent's ability to provide objective advice.'
C.

SMALL CARRIER BIASING

CRS are a great advantage to air carriers. They allow numerous travel agents all over the world to access the carrier's schedule and fares. Because travel agents are the primary distribution
mechanism and CRS are their main information source, smaller
carriers must participate in every CRS or they will be at a disadvantage in relation to their larger competitors.12 Smaller carriers are almost required to participate in CRS in order to fill
flights."3 Small carriers may not have a large advertising budget
8 See Learning, supra note 4, at 482.
8

See id.
,) See id.
I See id.
2

93

See Learning, supra note 4, at 481.

See id.
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required to overcome the need to participate in a CRS. 4 Instead, small carriers must enter into co-host agreements with at
least one CRS.
The co-host agreement is disadvantageous to the smaller carrier. In order to participate in the CRS, they often have to participate on terms that are not especially favorable for the airline.
As part of the co-host agreements, the small carrier must pay
booking fees to the CRS owner depending on the number of
flights booked. 9 5 One of the problems created by these co-host
agreements is that the smaller less-favored carriers must pay
higher booking fees per ticket.96 This is even more true when
the carrier directly competes with the CRS owner. 97 The higher
booking fees per ticket translate into higher fare prices for the
consumer. It has been estimated that CRS vendors make over
$300 million per year from smaller airlines. 8 This money is
generated through the booking fees, mentioned above, from
the smaller carriers. These fees far exceed the CRS actual transaction costs. 99 In fact, booking fees produce a 50 percent rate of
return of invested capital for Galileo and a 75 to 90 percent rate
of return for Sabre.'
These co-host agreements, display bias,
and compensation and incentives for travel agents are all barriers to a competitive market. They do not allow the travel agent
or the display on the CRS system to be unbiased. Each of these
problems influence the consumer's choice of travel provider by
directly biasing the travel agent's advice as to which carrier fits
the consumer's preferences or by indirectly biasing the prices.
III.
A.
1.

LEGAL HISTORY

ANTITRUST ACTIONS AGAINST AIRLINES

Legal Theories

When discussing antitrust actions, there are a few concepts
that must be understood. First, the Sherman Antitrust Act"'
regulates anticompetitive practices. In addition, there are two
94 See
95 See
96 See
97 See
98 See

id. at 480.

id.
id.

id. at 480-81.
id.

9 See id.
100 See Hearingon

the Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, (H.R. 5466, 138
CONG. REC. H. 8,093 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
101 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1998).
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distinct theories that are often discussed. These are the monopoly leveraging argument and the essential facilities doctrine.
The first two sections of the Sherman Act are the important
for this analysis.
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal.
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.... 1012
Section 1 deals with concerted activity, activity between or
among more than one company. "" Section two deals with unilateral activity, activity of a single entity." 4 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the Sherman Act "contains a 'basic distinction between concerted and independent action. ' ''11 5 The
Court also stated that concerted activity (§ 1 activity) is subject

to punishment if it restrains trade; unilateral activity (§ 2 activity), on the other hand, is subject to punishment if it threatens
actual monopolization. "
In the CRS context, Section 2 is the more important section.
In order for a plaintiff to recover under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, he must show either actual monopolization or attempted monopolization. Actual monopolization requires a
showing of two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 107 A claim for attempted
102
Wi2

1d.
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.

1991).
104See id.
105 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)). In
Copperweld, the Supreme Court was examining whether or not a parent company
and its subsidiary could be in concert for the purposes of the Sherman Act. The
Court found that they cotild not.
I,(- See id. at 767-68.
17 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 541 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19, (1985) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, (1966))).
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monopolization has two elements: "1) a specific intent to monopolize a relevant market; 2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct;
and 3) a dangerous probability of success.'"" Attempted monopolization arises when "the danger of monopolization is clear
and present, but before a full-blown monopolization has necessarily been accomplished."""1
a.

Monopoly Leveraging

The Second Circuit examined the monopoly leveraging theory in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' "' in 1979. It recognized
monopoly leveraging as a distinct cause' of action under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. The doctrine, as articulated by the Second Circuit, states that "the use of monopoly power attained in
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of § 2, even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize
the second market."' 11 Other circuits have followed the Second
Circuit and have used the monopoly
leveraging theory as an in12
recovery.
of
theory
dependent
There are two parts to the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
First, there must be a showing of an unwarranted advantage
gained from the use of the monopoly power." 3 Second, the
plaintiff must show that the two markets claimed to be leveraged
108 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542; see also Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791
F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
703 F.2d 534, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
109 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542.
"- 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). (Berkey was
one of the largest and most significant antitrust suits in history. The case was
unusual because Kodak was both Berkey's competitor and supplier in various
markets. The issue on appeal dealt with a new type of photo system, the 110.)
II ld. at 276.
112 See, e.g.,
Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 61 F.3d 1 (4th
Cir. 1998); St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football League,
154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998); Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 145 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1998); Great W. Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir. 1995); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540
(10th Cir. 1995); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1992).
113 See Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Cut Throat Competition in the Friendly Skies: Alaska
Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1603 (1992), 61 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 681, 690-91 (1992).
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are different and related."I4 Definition of the market however
has been difficult and many factors must be taken into account.
These factors include geography, product information, and usage demographics. 1 5 The plaintiff must show that there are two
distinct markets and that the markets are related because the
defendant used its monopoly power to gain an advantage in the
second market." 6
The monopoly leveraging concept can be applied to the area
of CRS. The CRS vendor can use the CRS system to secure a
monopoly over certain routes.'" The DOT even claims that
"the concept of monopoly leveraging is applicable to CRS's
[sic], since each vendor has the power and incentive to use its
control of a system to unfairly prejudice the competitive position of its airline rivals.""' ' The monopoly leveraging concept,
however, ignores the fact that, as discussed in Part IV, display
bias can be controlled through market forces. "[T]he expected
monopoly profits may not exceed the value of revenues earned
by selling the premier listing to another airline."' '" This theory
also seems to ignore the fact that travel agents are more likely to
subscribe to the CRS that gives their customers the best deal.
While there are lengthy contracts, travel agents can change their
subscription. In addition, customers will search for the travel
agency that gives them the best deal. As these two elementary
examples show, the monopoly leveraging doctrine does not fit
well to the reality of CRS and airlines.
Essential Facilities

b.

The essential facilities doctrine requires a business that controls an essential facility fails to provide its competitors reasonable access to that facility. 2 " "An essential facility is one which
cannot be reasonably duplicated and to which access is necesSee Callow, supra note 113, at 691. (For example, the CRS industry and the
airline industry could be considered related. One makes reservations and tracks
information for the other.)
115 See id.
-; See id. at 692.
This can occur through display biasing, discussed in supra Part II.A.
11 Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,586,
12,602 (1991).
119 Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 581.
120 See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F.
Supp. 1443, 1451 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856
(6th Cir. 1979).
117
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sary if one wishes to compete."'' This doctrine "imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a
second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the
second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first." '2
In order to recover under the doctrine of essential facilities, a
plaintiff must prove "that it is economically infeasible or impossible to reproduce the facility, and that it imposes a severe handicap on the market entrant if access is denied."1 23 The essential
facilities doctrine has not been accepted by all circuits and has
24
not been ruled on by the United States Supreme Court.1
The question that arises here is: Are CRS essential facilities?
There are differing answers to this question. The DOT stated in
1996 that it believes CRS are essential facilities. 25 Based on the
idea that CRS are essential facilities, the DOT required that
every system must offer all airlines access to its services on reasonable terms. 126 The Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc., however, found that CRS were not essential
facilities.1 27 This case occurred before the DOT mandate and
no cases have been brought since this declaration.
2.

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.

In 1991, the Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., examined both the essential facilities doctrine and the
monopoly leveraging doctrine in relation to CRS.128 In Alaska
Airlines, airline competitors sued United and American based on
121 In reAir Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp.
at 1451. See also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986).
122 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir.
1991).
123 Callow, supra note 113, at 689.
124 See generallyAspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985). In deciding this case, the Supreme Court refused to address the question
of whether or not the essential facilities doctrine was a viable doctrine. "Given
our conclusion that the evidence amply supports the verdict under the instructions as given by the trial court, we find it unnecessary to consider the possible
relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine, or the somewhat hypothetical question whether nonexclusionary conduct could ever constitute an abuse of monopoly power if motivated by an anticompetitive purpose. If, as we have assumed, no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing, that case is unlikely to
arise." Id. at 611 n.44.
125 "We concluded in our rulemaking that each of the systems is comparable to
an essential facility." Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 42,203.
126 See id.
127 See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549.
128 See id. at 54149 (discussing essential facilities and monopoly leveraging).
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allegations that their control over a CRS denied them access to
an essential facility, thus violating the Sherman Act. 129 The
plaintiffs were subscribers to Apollo and Sabre (the defendants'
CRS) and were concerned with the booking fees charged by
these particular CRS. 13 ° The plaintiffs claimed the defendants
had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by controlling an essential facility.' 3 ' The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, failing to recognize monopoly
leveraging or essential facilities doctrines. ' 2 The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit claiming that the district court had
incorrectly applied the doctrines.' 3
a.

Monopoly Leveraging

The plaintiffs claimed that the United and American Airlines
were using their power in the CRS market to gain a competitive
advantage over non-CRS-owner airlines. 14 The plaintiffs, however, admit that there is no claim under the theory of attempted
monopolization because there was no danger that either United
or American would monopolize the downstream market. 31 5 The
Ninth Circuit closely examined the Berkey monopoly leveraging
theory.'" It rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine as an independent theory of liability. 3 v In fact, the Ninth Circuit went
further in stating that it "believe [s] that Berkey Photo misapplied the elements of Section 2 by concluding that a firm violates Section 2 merely by obtaining a competitive advantage in
the second market, even in the absence of an attempt to monopolize the leveraged market." 3 '

See id. at 536.
See id. Airlines joined as plaintiffs included: Alaska Airlines, Muse Air Corporation, Midway Airlines, and Northwest Airlines.
131 ,See id.
132 See id. at 538.
133 See id.
I-" See id. at. 546.
13
, See id. at 545.
136 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); see alo supra notes 110-119 and accompanying
text.
137 See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547.
1 /d.
12

13o
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Essential Facilities

Alaska Airlines claimed that United Airlines and American
Airlines had control"'" of an essential facility (the CRS) and thus
had violated antitrust laws. 4 " The plaintiffs requested that the
court take a very broad view of essential facilities doctrine, claiming that the defendants had individually violated the Act even
though the defendants' control of the CRS did not give them
power to eliminate competition.'41 The Ninth Circuit reviewed
cases where courts found that the essential facilities applied and
analyzed each of cases in turn.
First, the Supreme Court has only dealt with one case involving a single firm's control of an essential facility. 4 2 In Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, the defendant (the power company)
refused to deal with its downstream competitors. The district
court found that Otter Tail had attempted to monopolize and
had actually monopolized distribution of electric power in its
area. "4' 3 When Otter Tail's retail franchises in small towns expired, it attempted to prevent the small towns from establishing
their own municipal electric systems, thereby limiting competition. 4' 4 In refusing to allow competitors access, Otter Tail eliminated any possibility of competition. The district court found
that Otter Tail had indeed illegally monopolized the electric
power industry in the area.' 4 5 The Supreme Court affirmed this
finding, concluding that Otter Tail, acting alone, had attempted
to monopolize and had in fact monopolized the market for electrical services.' 4 6
The second case that the Ninth Circuit examined was MCI
Communications Co. v. AT&T. In MCI Communications Co., the
Seventh Circuit found that the essential facilities doctrine did
apply.' 4 7 AT&T refused to allow MCI to use its network. MCI
sued AT&T for four separate causes of action: monopolization,
139 The control, as claimed by the plaintiffs, was individually, not jointly, exercised. Because the plaintiffs did not claim any violation under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act (concerted activity, with a much lower legal standard required for
showing of violation) the Ninth Circuit did not examine any wrongdoing under
that statutory section. See id. at 542 n.8.
1,0 See id. at 536.

I'll
See
112 See
1', See
141 See

id. at 542,
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
id. at 368.
id.

45 See id. at 373.

146See id.at 377-79.
",7 See MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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attempted monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize-under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act-and conspiracy of restraint of
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.48 Following a jury
verdict of $600 million, the trial court trebled the damages as
required by the Clayton Act, resulting in a judgment against
AT&T of $1.8 billion. 4" The Seventh Circuit found that AT&T
refused to grant access to a network that could not be duplicated and that this refusal allowed AT&T to eliminate the com15
petition in a downstream market.

The final case examined by the Ninth Circuit is the Second
Circuit's decision in Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness.''
Twin Labs was a competitor of Weider, both were involved in
making and marketing nutritional supplements. 1

2

Twin Labs

often advertised in Weider publications. Weider later promulgated a rule that would not allow Twin Labs to advertise in its
publications.' 53 Twin Labs asserted three federal law claims:
monopolization, denial of essential facilities, and attempted monopolization. '5' The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. 155 On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant argued
only the essential facility and attempted monopolization
claims.' 5" The Second Circuit found that the denial of access to
advertising was not an essential facility stating that "[a]ntitrust
law, however, does not require one competitor to give another a
break just because failing to do so offends notions of fair
7
play."'

5

After examining these cases, the Ninth Circuit found that in
order to have a facility considered "essential," the facility must
have "the power to eliminate competition in the downstream
market."' 5' The Ninth Circuit held that in Alaska Airlines, the
defendants' control did not give them the power to eliminate
competition since the plaintiffs were free to withdraw from Sa148 See id. at 1092.

1,i, See id. at
150 See id. at
151 900 F.2d
152 See id. at
153 See id.
15 See id. at
1,

1093.
1133.
566 (2d Cir. 1990).
567.
568.

See id. at 567.

See id. at 568.
i.
158 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544.
156
157
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bre or Apollo. 5 ' Therefore, the CRS was not an essential
facility. 60

B.

1.

REGULATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS

Civil Aeronautics Board Authority

The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) promulgated the original
CRS regulations in 1984.161 The CAB stated that in the Airline
Deregulation Act, Congress placed a high priority on
the prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive
practices in air transportation, including the avoidance of "excess
market domination and monopoly power" and other conditions
"that would tend to allow one or more air carriers unreasonably
to increase prices,2 reduce services, or exclude competition in air
6
transportation."
In fact, the CAB expressly stated that in light of the Airline
Deregulation Act, "we believe that we have not only the authority but the responsibility under section 411 to take action to prevent the use of market power in the CRS industry to lessen
competition in air transportation."' 6
The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the CAB. 16 4 The court stated that the provision in
the Federal Aviation Act that allows the CAB to make rules also
empowers it to "make only rules 'pursuant to and consistent
with the provisions of' the Act."' 6 5 Section 411 authorizes the
Board to "investigate and determine whether any air carrier...
has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair
methods of competition."' 6" In addition, the Board may order
159See id. at 545.
-, See id. at 549.

161See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644
(1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
162 Id.
163Id. at 11,656.
164See United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir.
1985).
165See id. at 1111. (Interpreting two sections of the CAB regulations: 14 C.F.R.

§§ 255, 256).
166See id.; see also Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1985) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 41712). In fact, the Board has been issuing rules based on this section
since 1960; see, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 250 (dealing with overbooking); 14 C.F.R. pt.
254 (dealing with liability of airlines for lost luggage).
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the air carriers to stop such behavior." 7 This rule is still currently in place with only slightly modified language." '
Various agencies of the government were concerned about
anticompetitive practices. Complaints were filed about the operation of the CRS systems."" - The CAB found that "[t] he companion prohibition against 'unfair or deceptive practices' in
both section 411 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was intended to protect consumers from trade practices
which, while not necessarily anticompetitive, were misleading,
contrary to recognized public policy or injurious to consumers." 171 They felt that they could "forestall conduct where we
find that a potential for abuse exists."' 7 1 In 1984, the potential
was great enough that the CAB issued regulations regarding the
17 2
use and operation of CRS.
2.

Development of CAB Regulations

The CAB found that "CRSs became essential for airline distribution in the early 1980s'1 7 because of their "predominant role
in the marketing of airline services to customers."'' 74 The CAB
determined that the rules regulating the CRS were necessary because travel agencies and their customers could not prevent the
167 See id.; Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1985) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41712).
1- Unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition. On the initiative of the Secretary of Transportation or the complaint of an air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent, and if the Secretary considers it is in the public interest, the Secretary may investigate and decide whether an air carrier, foreign air
carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in an tinfair or deceptive practice
or an unfair method of competition in air transportation or the sale of air transportation. If the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, finds
that an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in an unfair or
deceptive practice or unfair method of competition, the Secretary shall order the
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to stop the practice or method. 49
U.S.C. § 41712 (1996).
119 Complaints were filed by many airlines. In addition, many airlines commented that regulations were needed. See generally Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644 (1984) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 255).
170 i. at 11,653.
171

[i.

See. Carrier-Owned Computer
255.12 (1998). CAB regulations deal
cluding: display bias, enhancements,
participation. See infra Part IV.
171 Computer Reservations System
47,607 (1997).
174, Fail- Displays of Airline Services
61 Fed. Reg. 42,197, 42,208 (1996).
I%

Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.1with most aspects of the CRS industry incontracts with participating carriers, and
(CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606,
in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
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systems from offering biased displays and non-CRS-owning airlines did not have the power to keep the systems from biasing
their displays. 7 5 The CAB found the prejudice unacceptable.
"In 1982, the Board [CAB], along with the justice Department's
Antitrust Division, had, at the request of a Congress besieged
with complaints from travel agents and from airlines that do not
own computerized reservation systems, begun to investigate biasing, price discrimination, and related practices." ' 76

In 1984, due in part to the CAB and Justice Department findings from the investigation requested by Congress, the CAB
promulgated regulations for airline-owned and travel agent
used CRS. The CAB found "evidence that the owners of computerized reservation systems had engaged in price discrimination and other practices symptomatic of monopoly or market

power." 177
The CAB was abolished in October of 1984.178 "Congress...

was very concerned to preserve (in the Department of Transportation) authority to enforce section 411.''

7

Now, the authority

to enforce these regulations lies with the Department of
Transportation.
3. DOT Takeover of CAB Authority and New Regulations
After the DOT takeover, the CRS regulations stayed substantially the same. In 1985, the Department of Justice found that
CRS owners still possessed substantial market power and that
the pricing practices continued to be discriminatory. 80 The
DOT announced that it would review the allegations of abuse.
In 1992, the DOT promulgated more stringent regulations.'8 '
Again in the late 1990s, the DOT began to get complaints from
smaller air carriers." 2 This has prompted a call for another revi175 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,547548 (1984).
176 United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir.
1985).
177 Id. at 1117.
178 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. No. L. 98-443, §§ 3, 7, 98
Stat. 1703, 1706 (1984).
179 United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1112.
180 See Learning, supra note 4, at 478.
181 See id. These are the regulations that are currently in force.
182 These carriers include: Alaska Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Midwest Express,
American West, and Delta. See generally Computer Reservations System (CRS)
Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,197 (1996); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996); Computer Reser-
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sion of the rules. In fact, there is currently an open comment
period regarding yet another change in the regulations.'
IV.
A.

CURRENT REGULATIONS
COVERAGE OF THE RULES

The regulations governing activity by CRS are actually quite
broad, covering most all areas of CRS usage and marketing.
The rules prohibit the CRS owners from biasing their display
screens based on the identity of the carrier.'8 4 The CAB and
later the DOT mandated that each CRS charge the same booking fee for each airline listed. 85 The regulations also cover contracts between CRS vendors and participating airlines,'
participation levels by owners and subscribers, 8 7 the use of
hardware and software, 8 and finally, marketing and booking
information. I"?

The stated purpose of the regulations is to "prevent unfair,
deceptive, predatory, and anticompetitive practices in air transportation."''" The regulations also state that compliance does
not exempt persons from antitrust statutes, i.e. the Clayton
vations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,195 (1997); Fair Displays of
Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837
(1997); Complaint of Delta Airlines, Inc. against American Airlines, Inc. and SABRE Associates, Inc., Order 96-10-48, 1996 WL 628193 (D.O.T.) (1996).
18"See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations (Part 255), 63 Fed.
Reg. 3491 (1998).
The Department regulates computer reservations systems owned by
airlines or airline affiliates that are used by travel agencies. The current rules are designed to prevent the systems from unreasonably
prejudicing the competitive position of other airlines and to ensure
that travel agencies can provide accurate and unbiased information
to the public. The Department is reexamining its rules to see
whether they should be readopted and, if so, whether they should
be changed. As part of this action, a small entities review under 5
U.S.C. § 610 will be included.
Unified Agenda, 63 Fed. Reg. 22,304, 22,305-06 (1998).
184 Note, The Legal and legulatory Implications of Airline Computer Reservation Systems, 103 HARV. L. RFV. 1930, 1932 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
185 See id.

186See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.6
(1998).
187See id.
188 See id.
18) See id.
190 Id. § 255.1.

2000]

COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS

917

Act.' 91 Applicability of the regulations is also broad. This rule
applies to air carriers that "own, control, operate, or market
computerized reservations systems. ' 1 2 In addition, the regulation states that the responsibility for compliance with these regulations lies with the CRS owners.',"
In addition to applicability of the regulations to companies,
the regulations also explicitly state what types of systems are subject to the regulations. The DOT defines "system" as "computerized reservations system offered by a carrier or its affiliate to
subscribers for use in the United States that contains information about schedules, fares, rules or availability of other carriers
and provides subscribers with the ability to make reservations
and to issue tickets, if it charges any other carrier a fee for system services.""'9 This definition has definite implications for the
applicability of the regulations to Internet usage.
As discussed earlier, participation in a CRS is vital for most
airlines. With a few exceptions, every major U.S. airline participates in a CRS system. The DOT requires that "[iln ordering
the information contained in an integrated display, systems shall
not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to carrier identity."'1 95 This is helpful for the smaller carriers. In addition, the
DOT states that "[s]ystems shall not use any factors directly or
indirectly relating to carrier identity in constructing the display
of connecting flights in an integrated display."' 96 As a check on
the systems, the regulations are written to allow anyone to request and receive information about the criteria
and weights
97
used in ordering flights that are displayed. 1
Another problem identified by the CAB and the DOT is that
CRS vendors often delayed the posting of fare change, flight
availability, and other information. This can cause reduced
bookings on smaller air carriers who may otherwise attempt to
take advantage of "sales" and "special pricing." In order to deal
with this situation, the regulations require that "[e]ach system
shall apply the same standards of care and timeliness to loading
information concerning participating carriers as it applies to the
"9'
See id. § 255.1(b). The Clayton Act is a statute that imposes liability on
those companies who attempt to monopolize.
1'12 See id. § 255.2.
193 See id. § 255.2.
19-Id. § 255.3.
195Id. § 255.4(b).
196 Id. § 255.4(c).
197See id § 255.4(b) (3).
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loading of its own information or the information of a system
owner." 198
The final problem identified in Part II was that of discriminatory fees. These can be particularly disastrous for smaller carriers. The regulations require that "[nlo system may discriminate
among participating carriers in the fees for participation in its
system, or for system-related services. Differing fees to participating carriers for the same or similar levels of service shall be
presumed to be discriminatory."''
In addition, participation
cannot be dependent on the purchase of any equipment, such
as terminal, computers, printers, etc.00 This is important because before the regulations use of a CRS required that the user
purchase hardware from the CRS vendor. This made it very difficult for travel agents to change CRS vendors because each
change meant more money invested in computer hardware.
As this brief description of the current rules shows, the
problems identified by both the CAB in the early 1980s and the
DOT in the late 1990s have been addressed through regulation.
Unfortunately, problems still exist as evidenced by complaints
and the continuation of the regulation.21' The DOT does not
actively enforce these regulations. The legal system is the main
venue for challenging CRS vendor's actions. There is a disagreement with courts (like the Ninth Circuit who found that
CRS are not essential facilities) and the DOT (who claims that
CRS are essential facilities). This conflict restricts potential
party access to the courts because they know that most courts
will not apply the essential facilities doctrine to CRS vendors and
no other legal doctrine seems to apply.
B.

ARE THE REGULATIONS STILL NEEDED?

"The industry's dependence on SABRE and Apollo has resulted in American's and United's domination of the air transportation market. American and Untied control the agency
ticket distribution system and thus are able to manipulate the
economics of the current market while controlling the development of new markets. 1' 202
§ 255.4(d).
1..Id. § 255.6.
200 See id. § 255.6.
198 Id.

201 See, e.g., Complaint of Delta Airlines, Inc. against American Airlines, Inc.
and SABRE Associates, 1996 Order 96-10-48, WL 628193 (D.O.T.) (1996).
202Paul V. Mifsud, Computer Reservations Systehis and Automated Market Distribulion in a Deregudated Aviation Industry, 1 J.L. & TECH. 143, 146 (1986).
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In 1984, when considering the regulations, the CAB found
three distinct problem areas.2 1° First, display bias seemed prevalent in the industry.2 4 Second, they felt that the charges for
smaller non-owning airlines for access to the CRS were discriminatory. 20 5 Finally, they found that the CRS gave owners a potential advantage over other competitors. 2 6 There have been, in
the very recent past, more complaints about the operation of
CRS. These complaints revolve around both the booking fees
and level of service offered. 2 7 However, the question remains,
are regulations from a branch of the federal government still
needed? The answer to this question deals with which better
serves the customer: regulation or free market competition.
The DOT believes that regulation is the path to a betterserved customer. It sees the problems with CRS as a market failure. 21 "8 The DOT believes that the market forces are insufficient
to promote consumer welfare. 2 '' Before regulation, the
problems were many; unfortunately, many of the same problems
still exist.
Display bias was prevalent before regulation (and some argue
continues today). This, in the eyes of many, is proof of the market failure. The DOT found that "[b]ecause travel agents are
busy, they usually booked a flight from the first screen of the
display and often booked the first flight displayed . . . . As a
result, travel agents often booked consumers on less suitable
flights because the best flight was in a lower position on the first
screen or was on a later screen."' 2 ' Some observers question
whether this is true.2" 1 ' It seems illogical that travel agents, in
trying to serve their customers, would not scroll to the next
screen to find the best deal, if indeed the CRS were biased. Customers may "shop around" to other travel agents or to the In203 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,645 (1984).
204 See id. at 11,645.
•05 See id.

206 See id.
207 See generally Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg.
60,195 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRS), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996).
208 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606,
47,607 (1997).
209 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 576.
210 Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,586,
12,608 (1991).
211 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 577.
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ternet to find the best price. The argument that a travel agent
would not be willing to look through several screens for the best
match for the customer does not carry much weight.
The second problem addressed is the idea that the market
cannot adequately regulate the CRS market. The main concern
is display bias. Again, this is when an owner CRS displays its
flights more prominently than the flights of the subscribers.
This problem, too, could be controlled through market forces.
Market forces would be more efficient than regulation. One
suggestion is that the CRS vendor could charge more for the
higher priority slots. 2 12 It seems that many airlines would pay
high prices for their flights to appear in the highest slot.2 1

This

would allow the airlines that value the highest spot to purchase
it. The CRS vendor would simply "sell" it to the highest bidder,
even if the owner itself were the highest bidder. In this way, the
market would serve both competition and the consumer more
efficiently than regulation.
Another problem with regulation is that it interferes with innovation.2 14 Because of the concern surrounding algorithms
used and possible display bias, any CRS vendor that attempts to
vary its methods may be subject to DOT complaints and further
regulation.2 15 Choice of algorithms drives the bias; innovation in
this area could possibly solve many of the problems. Without
the freedom to experiment, the federal government may indeed
need to continue regulation.
The airlines have not fully considered a free speech argument. The Competitive Enterprise Institute attempted to intervene in many of the initial suits but courts denied its motions. 211
The CRS regulations can be seen as speech of an electronic nature, "where a party profiting from the customers attracted by
'' 2 17
the information supplied the medium for communication.

This argument had been raised regarding the OAG in earlier
suits. There, the FTC argued that because the OAG was an essential facility, restrictions on normal freedom of speech were
id.
This rests on the assumption that the travel agent will not take the few extra
seconds necessary to find a flight that fits the customers exact preferences for
price, service, connections, etc.
21" This is true in many areas, not just in the Airline Computer Reservation
System arena.
215 See Note, supra note 185, at 1946.
216 See Fred L. Smith, The Casefor Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (If Repeal is
not an Option) 23 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 23, 36 (1999).
212 See
213

217
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justified. 2 18 However, the DOT considers CRS essential facilities,
the single court to examine the issue found that CRS were not
essential facilities. 2 19 This argument may be viable in any challenge to the regulations.
Finally, competition in the CRS industry is currently not possible. An unbiased CRS may be more popular than the current
CRS on the market. Unfortunately, current regulation stifles development. Travel agents may pay more in the beginning for a
CRS that claims to be unbiased and not affiliated with any airbest method for
line. The market for an objective would be the
2 1
regulation, not government imposed rules.
V.

APPLICATION OF DOT REGULATIONS TO
INTERNET USE

Therefore, having discussed the development and operation
of CRS, the concerns regarding CRS, and current regulations,
the question now turns to the future. As in many areas of modern life, the Internet is the medium of the future. E-commerce
is a new and developing area of law. The current federal regulations in many areas have not kept up with our emerging electronic reality. As discussed in Part I, CRS have entered the
Internet Age and are on-line.2 2 1 Users are able to purchase everything from audio equipment to clothing on-line; airline tickets
are no exception. By using CRS, home users may not only find
airline tickets and learn about their availability, they can actually
use their credit cards to purchase the tickets. This has potential
impacts for consumers. How would the current regulations apply to CRS usage on the Internet? Do they currently apply? Will
the DOT ever regulate Internet usage of CRS? These are important questions to answer in the age of instant information.
A.

APPLICATION OF CURRENT REGULATIONS

To

INTERNET

CRS

There are many obstacles to overcome if the current regulations are to apply to Internet usage of CRS.2 22 The purpose of
the regulations is to "set forth requirements for the operation
218

See id.

219

See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir.

1991).
See Note, supra note 185, at 1946.
The CRS on-line are the same as those offered to travel agents (APOLLO,
SABRE, etc.)
222 Note: This is a very new area of the law. As a consequence, there are no
cases that deal with Internet CRS.
220
221
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by air carriers and their affiliates of computer reservations systems used by travel agents so as to prevent unfair, deceptive, predatory, and anticompetitive practices in air transportation. '2 3
This section could be a serious impediment to regulation of Internet use. Most people who will use the Internet systems to
find and book flights will not be travel agents. Therefore, the
Internet systems may not fall under the regulation because of
this fact.224 The DOT has explicitly stated that the regulations

will not apply to "systems used by persons other than travel agencies. '12 5 The DOT also states that "we will not make our rules
applicable to systems available to home computer users. "226 It
reasons that there is no proof of prejudice to airline competition.27 The main question in these statements is whether the
DOT envisioned in 1992 that the Internet would become a daily
part of most American's lives. The DOT has begun to examine
the impact of the Internet on CRS regulations. It will be a significant part of the study in determining whether to continue
228
and expand the regulations.
The regulations also only purport to regulate "air carriers and
foreign air carriers that themselves or through an affiliate own,
control, operate, or market computer reservations systems for
travel agents .... 22, Again, as in the previous discussion, the
regulation specifically states that the rules apply only to computer reservation systems for travel agents. This section,
though, is seemingly less restrictive than the previous section.
Because of the limitation on owning, controlling, operating, or
marketing the systems this could apply to Internet systems. This
is especially true if the same company owns a travel agent CRS
223 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.1 (1998)
(emphasis added).
224 One clear exception to this will be Worldspan, who in its website makes it
clear that the reservations are made through Tampa Travel Service, Inc. See
Worldspan, Dales & Destinations (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http:///www.worldspan.
net>.
225 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 42,794.
2" Id. at 42,794-95.
227 See id.
228 See Second Extension of Computer Reservations Systems Regulations, 64
Fed. Reg. 15,127, 15,128 (1999).
21, Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.2 (1998)
(emphasis added). It is important to note that Computer Reservation Systems
operated and owned independently of air carriers are also not regulated under
this section. This could possibly negate the argument in the previous section
about the development and marketing of an unbiased system that would be more
attractive to travel agents.
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and operates an Internet CRS. The difference here is the use of
the word "for" rather than the phrase "used by." In addition,
there is no addition of the word "exclusively." One could argue
that either of these regulations could apply to Internet CRS. Because of the specific requirement that the regulations cover only
CRS owned in part by an airline, Sabre, since its spin-off from
American Airlines, is no longer covered by these regulations.
The definition section of the regulation makes it fairly clear
that Internet CRS will not be regulated under the current rules.
First, the regulations refer to computer reservations systems as
"systems." System is defined as a "computerized reservations system offered by a carrier or its affiliate to subscribers for use in
the United States that contains information about schedules,
fares, rules or availability of other carriers and provides subscribers with the ability to make reservations and to issue tickets, if it
' 2 This seccharges any other carrier a fee for system services. 23
tion nearly defines Internet CRS out of regulation. First, the
emphasis on not only making reservations but also on issuing
tickets. Currently, Internet users are not able to issue their own
tickets. Second, the definition discusses "subscribers." This section defines this term as well. "Subscriber means a ticket agent,
as defined in 49 U.S.C. section 1301(40) that holds itself out as a
neutral source of information about, or tickets for, the air transportation industry and that uses a system."'23 ' The definition
seems to preclude Internet users from being a "subscribers" and
the program used on the Internet as a "system." In addition, the
DOT states that "our proposed rule would not apply to instances where CRS's [sic] are used by ticket agents who hold
themselves out as agents of selected carriers, nor does it32apply to
2
CRS's [sic] used by persons other than ticket agents.
The rules themselves seem to regulate only CRS owned by airlines or affiliated with them and used by human travel agents.
Both of these terms restrict the regulations and do not allow the
rules to regulate systems used on-line. The DOT has also stated
that it is not attempting to regulate Internet systems.23 3 In
promulgating the original regulations the DOT explicitly stated
"[w]e propose to regulate only carrier-owned systems, and only
those used by travel agents as that term is commonly understood
Id. § 255.3.
h(.
232 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644, 11,668
(1984).
233 See id. at 11,658.
23o
231
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today .. ..,,2 This language seems to imply that any system or
user outside this mandate is not covered. Hence, the regulations do not cover Internet use.
Air carriers have also voiced opinions on this topic. The Association of Asia Pacific Airlines has stated that "[tlo the extent
that certain parties may want to propose that airline reservation
systems offered through the Internet be subject to the CRS regulations, we believe that airline reservation systems do not constitute a 'system' as defined in the U.S. CRS rules, and, hence,
25
should not be covered by them.

B.

WILL THE

DOT

REGULATE INTERNET

CRS?

As seen from the previous section, the current regulations
probably do not apply to Internet usage of CRS. There have
been no cases or official rulings on this point. When Internet
users log on to the Internet CRS, they may not realize that the
system is closely affiliated with an airline. This is the problem of
deception recognized by the Ninth Circuit in the Alaska Airlines
case. " The CRS could feasibly bias the displays to enhance the
matches for their airline affiliate. -7
The question remains: Will the DOT regulate the Internet?
Moreover, if so, how will they accomplish the regulation? The
DOT recognizes the importance of the Internet but to date has
not specifically regulated Internet CRS usage. 38 In 1997, they
stated that "relatively few consumers currently book airline
travel through the Internet.

'2 9

Many airlines have appealed to

the DOT to resolve the issue. Some have called for increased
regulation expanded to include Internet CRS. According to the
DOT: "The growth of Internet booking sites has led to requests
that we extend the coverage of at least some of our rules to such
booking sites. ' 4

The Association of Asia Pacific Airlines

(t.
3 Asia/Pacific Carriers Target Internet, Abusive CRS Bookings, AEROSPACE DAILY,

234

Dec. 10, 1997, at A25.
236 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1991).
237 Admittedly, this would be a difficult task. Any CRS with on-line connec-

tions, would have to produce two entirely different algorithms for use on its system. This seems to be a costly venture only to obtain a few more seats.
238 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837, 63,842 (1997).
239 Id.
240 Computer

47,607 (1997).

Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606,
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(AAPA) has called for the DOT to examine Internet booking. 241
In addition, "Amadeus (supported by Continental) urges us
[DOT] to regulate the displays offered by on-line computer services and Internet sites. 2 42
The DOT does seem willing to consider regulating Internet
usage. The idea has come up in many of its recent publications
regarding the CRS rules.24 The Department has issued a call
for public comment on the topic. They also note that "[t]he
impact of the Internet, however, is an issue that we intend to
consider in detail in our upcoming examination of the CRS
rules. 244
If the DOT does decide to regulate Internet usage of CRS,
how may they go about it? There have been many suggestions
on how this could occur. US Airways suggests that "companies
providing Internet booking ability be given the option of complying with anti-bias rules or notifying consumers that they do
not."245 This would be an information requirement. A regulation dealing with this may mandate that companies at least tell
users which company owns and controls the CRS. A second possibility would be for the DOT to require that all CRS use the
same algorithm. This would be an extreme solution because it
would force all CRS into a single mold, possibly stifling
innovation.
One problem is encountered with the above mentioned solutions. The goal of the current regulations is to enhance competition and allow the consumer to have an unbiased answer to his
travel questions. When a person calls a travel agent, he assumes
that the travel agent is working for him, finding him the best
flight to meet his needs. With an Internet CRS, the same may or
may not be true. Without the human contact, the expectation
may be lower. There may or may not be the expectation that
the system is working for the individual and is unbiased.
See Asia/Pacific Carriers Target Internet, Abusive CRS Bookings, AEROSPACE
at A25.
Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
62 Fed. Reg. at 63,846.
243 See generally Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRS), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837 (1997); Computer Reservations System (CRS)
Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,313 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837 (1997).
244 Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
62 Fed. Reg. at 63,842-43.
245 US Airways Warns of Continued Upward Spiral in CRS Fees, AVIATION DAILY, Jan.
12, 1998, at 48.
241

DAILY, Dec. 10, 1997,
242 Fair Displays of
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Coming to a conclusion in situations such as this is often difficult. As a society, we are coming into a new age of human existence. The Internet has become and will continue to be the
medium of the future. The federal and state governments will
soon have to address concerns regarding the Internet. For example, Who owns the Internet? Can it be taxed? How do the
Internet and the First Amendment intertwine? The Department
of Transportation, too, is currently examining questions about
CRS and the Internet.
Society was changing rapidly in the mid-1970s. After deregulation many more airlines formed to serve passengers. Schedules became more intricate to deal with the ever-increasing
number of airline passengers. CRS were developed to adapt to
this changing society. Information about airline reservations
was too volumous to be adequately controlled by manual operation. It only took a decade before these new systems designed to
deal with complicated information developed into an industry
itself.
CRS quickly became indispensable in controlling airline information. Because of this importance and dependence on CRS,
problems began to arise. Biasing, limiting available information, and providing incentives for travel agents soon began to
interfere in fair competition.
Society has now entered yet another era. The 1960s and
1970s saw the beginning of the computer era. The 1990s have
become the Internet era. There are many questions about who
will "control" or regulate the Internet. This is a special concern
for CRS. As it stands now, the DOT regulations do not seem to
apply to Internet use by non-travel agent individuals. The definitions in the regulations seem to preclude application to Internet use. There have been many antitrust situations involving
CRS in the past. This will probably continue into the future unless the DOT addresses the problem quickly. In the realm of the
CRS industry, there is great potential for abuse. Either the government or private party actions will soon determine how much
abuse the market can withstand. The DOT, however, will probably be better equipped to deal with the situation found in the
travel industry.
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